Failure to Deliver: The Journey of the Oromo Liberation Front in the Last Two Decades (Part II)

PART II: SOURCES OF INEFFICIENCY

In the first part, I have discussed how lack of action perpetuated the crisis within OLF and damaged it beyond repair. I have suggested that growth of  regionalism and incompetent leadership are mitigating factors that are the by-product  of the chaotic life cycle of an organization that lack action.  Now I must answer the legitimate question. Why did the organization lack such necessary action to avoid the problem in the first place? In this part, I present three major factors that hindered the organization  from delivering the much needed action. The first factor, forces us to look back into the history of the organization and  understand that the front inherited deep and complicated political tradition that prevented the leadership from dealing the root cause. The second and third factors are new phenomenons that the organization faced during the last decade or so.

a) Inherited Destructive Organizational Traditions

OLF is a foster child of the student movement that brought the revolution; as such it shares some common organizational behaviors and characteristics with all other organizations that came out that era, such as the EPRP, TPLF and EPLF. Some of these characteristics are lack of political civility, sense of entitlement and the desire to control everything and everyone within the society they claim to represent. These behaviors are the result of the situation they came out of, therefore we must look at the social and political climate under which the student movement was created, formed and developed into political parties.

After the 1960’s coup attempt blew off the lid of “untouchability” from Harresillassie, students began debating and discussing politics, breaking the taboo of ” zim bala af zimb aygebam”- a mouth that remains shut has no worry for flies. However, the absence of any culture of political dialogue prior to that era means the young students had to deal with the highly charged communist theory without any prior knowledge about political civility that is essential for constructive debates to take place. Thus, it was common for discussions and debates to heat-up and name calling and fighting to ensue. Policy and ideological debates were assumed to be ways of differentiating the winner from the looser which usually led to jubilation and humiliation. Arguments were taken so personally that it usually resulted in the formation of cliques. Character assassination politics that have been too common among Ethiopian politicians has its origin to that era.

The situation got worse when the regime moved to suppress the student movement. To overcome the persecution of the security forces, the discussions and debates went underground, through formation of small cells, where secrecy was crucial. Those underground cells were the breeding ground for the already rife Abyssinian debtera culture of suspicion and conspiracy. The debtera tradition is one that is full of secrecy, conspiracy and backstabbing.  In that world, there are clear winners and losers. Concepts such agreeing to disagree and power sharing are unknown. If a group member disagrees with a view held by the majority, he was excluded from the cell and begins his own defamation campaign against his former friends often by creating new cliques. The underground world made it difficult to differentiate credible information from fabricated vengeful accusations. This created a favorable condition for individuals to falsely accuse those who disagree with them.

Thus, the two political parties that came out of the student movement, MEISON and EPRP, and the later ones such as OLF, were built by individuals who had their first political training on the chaotic campus and the underground world. The revolutionaries were known for fighting over nothing and suspecting everything. It is now clear MEISON and EPRP, although lead by some of the brightest individuals, destroyed each other practically over insignificant differences.

Founders of OLF brought good share of that political tradition with them, that one should not be surprised to find out that the leaders spend most of their time chasing rumors than developing fact based strategy. When the first power struggle broke out, Jaarraa was accused of conspiring with Somalia to spread Islam, and his team in return hit back by labeling OLF as a Protestant organization. If a leader disagrees with a person from Shawa, the accepted tactic was to tie him with the dead Gobana – a sellout, regardless of that person’s merits and records. This has contributed to insignificant participation and representation of Shawa in OLF – despite its numerical and strategic importance.

How people like Lencho Leta were  dealt with is  another example. Although he was one of the founding members of the organization who played critical role, mostly good but some unforgettable mistakes, after 1993, so many rumors, conspiracy theories and accusations were orchestrated about him. Some called him a sleeper agent, other accused of selling the cause to TPLF, and some  swore that he is not even an Oromo. Here is what is interesting, those ridiculous rumors were mostly fabricated by individuals who know the man from childhood, and never raised such issues while working with him for decades. There is no doubt that Lencho’s mistakes have played critical role in the disastrous encampment of the OLA, but he was not solely responsible. The remaining leadership embarked on the defamation campaign in order to  paint Lencho as a sellout and enemy infiltrator, then  blame him for everything that went wrong–so that they can be  relieved of  accountability. This tradition is so widespread within the organization that it has become the most preferred method of covering up issues and discrediting one another. It has also contributed to the infamous extreme negative reaction against critics and the common practice of outsourcing cause of failure by fabricating excuses. Never admitting mistakes and blame-game is a shared characteristic of all those organizations and individuals that came out of the student movement.

Before falling under subjugation, the Oromo had no hierarchical social structure, that all men regardless of their wealth or political role were considered equal. The poor and rich dined together, even the Abba Gada never received a bow from a layman. The Abyssinians were different; strict hierarchical division based on wealth, family and power were enforced.  Sense of entitlement was so strong amongst those rich and powerful.  The youth who established our movement was by large trained under such system that, although they rose against it, they could not completely free themselves from this culture of entitlement. This was clear from the very beginning as the educated were so elitist that they staged a coup against Jaarra Abbagadaa simply because they felt that he was not good enough since he had no “modern” education.

As the organization moved on, education as a source of entitlement was replaced by the years one has spent with organization. Although hundreds of highly skilled soldiers and well qualified intellectuals joined the organization, they were denied the opportunity to utilize their skills and knowledge to benefit the front. This has immensely contributed to the lack of effective leaders the movement desperately needed.

One of the main characteristics of the leftist organizations was their obsession to control every aspect of their society. They are so obsessed with controlling the mind. Such organization, who always claim to be the “vanguard” of the cause regardless of their popularity and strength, work so hard to make sure that their constituency falls under their absolute monopoly. The youth, the women, the elders, the religious institution and business are expected to be organized under the vanguard party. Information flows through tightly controlled, top-to-bottom structure.

The political forces that emerged from the student movement were led by individuals who worshiped Mao Zedong and Stalin , so they embraced such undemocratic, rigid and control freak organizational model. The TPLF today controls the youth, women and farmers associations, the church, the mosque, the media, businesses and almost every aspect of the Ethiopian people.  OLF, which claims to  oppose such totalitarianism, wastes so much time and resource to control the Oromo community association, the scholarly organization, Maccaa Tuulamaa, Waaqeffannaa, churches, mosques,  and the media including the Internet if they can. Unfortunately for OLF, the time when people accepted such control in the name of satisfying the vanguard, has passed as citizens are sick and tired of any kind of dictatorships,  be it individual, party or a state. Unlike Woyane and Shyabia, it had no state power to enforce its desire, therefore every attempt it makes to control civic associations has backfired.

In general, as the product of the 1970’s student movement, OLF has done so much for the Oromo people by challenging and destroying the Abyssinian cultural and political colonialism. Unfortunately it has also inherited all the evils of the Abyssinian hierarchical culture and the totalitarian leftist organizational tradition. As time changed, these inherited organizational and structural norms have contributed to the slow death of the front.

b) Exile Politics: The Reality Gap and Sucking the Energy Out of the Grassroots

When they left the charter in 1992, the OLF leaders abandoned their soldiers and supporters without any notice or guidance. The chaos and confusion that followed caused general breakdown of the command structure where rules and discipline were ignored, and some rogue soldiers committed unspeakable crimes against their own people, especially in Hararge. The disorganized and leaderless soldiers fell pray for the well financed and effectively commanded Shabiya-Woyane coalition that, despite the heroic defense by the field commanders, effectively removed OLA from its liberated zones. The organization that was believed to have some forty thousand soldiers was left with a small fraction of that, as many perished and the majority were rounded up and thrown to jail or just gave up. The blame-game that flared up amongst the leadership, soon after, further disabled the front from regrouping and hitting back.

Although OLF claims to be led by a National Assembly comprised of some forty or so people, since late 1990s, there is no single individual who resides within the Oromian soil. The vast majority of the leadership reside in the Western countries where they wage cyber politics while the remaining few have taken comfortable refuge under the wing of the Eritrean dictator.

An organization that has its leadership in exile cannot lead a struggle because of two simple realities. First, presence of a leader amongst his supporters and soldiers has significant symbolic role both in strengthening party cohesion as well as boosting moral.  It is morally indefensible for a leader of any movement, let alone, an armed front, to sit in a safe and comfortable place and urge oppressed and poor people to die. Soldiers and followers need a leader who can command them by example, by starving and surviving with them. The presence of a leader amongst fighters boosts their confidence, loyalty and commitment.  OLF leaders betrayed their members and the Oromo people by running away when the time got tougher, as a result not only did they lose respect but also numerous conspiracy theories were developed about the true desire of the leadership. Second, an exiled leader faces serious reality gap. Policies and strategies that are developed based on second-hand and heresy information are sure to fail. The political, social, environmental and economic realities of today’s Oromia are dramatically different than they were when OLF leaders left Oromia over a decade ago.

Departure of the leadership moved the center of the struggle from Oromia to the Diaspora. The more the leadership stayed away from the homeland, the more dependent they became on the Diaspora for support, which forced them to cater to their views and demands. Leaders prioritized  the satisfaction of the Diaspora base so the dollar would continue to flow that, they ignored the burning plight of the peasants in Oromia. An interesting evidence of  this  can be observed from the annual display of pictures of soldiers to arouse emotions and convince supporters about victories it had never accomplished.

A rebels’ success depends on how well its structures are intertwined with the people and land it fights to liberate. A rebel that is dependent on its mass has to continue to improve its performance both in expanding its control, and defend the peasant from enemy attack. Thus, the necessity of gaining material and tactical support from the peasants necessitates an insurgent movement to continue delivering tangible results. Since OLF leadership, in the past decade or so, did not really rely on the Oromo peasants, they did not have to fulfill their duty in order to survive. The Diaspora, who do not deal with daily abuse by the oppressive system, do not truly see the fierce urgency someone in Oromia feels. That is why, leaders and supporters of OLF who live outside Oromia rather derail the struggle forever than see their perspective views and faction lose this endless war of words. It is also important to note that even if all Oromo political factions in the Diaspora reconcile and united by some miracle, they cannot produce any result as long as the leadership remains in exile

Oromos must learn from the experience of the Tibetan people, that despite being the most internationally supported independence movement and  led by one of the most famous individuals  on earth ( Dalai Lama) , today they are not any closer to independence than they were fifty years ago.  By establishing an exiled government, the Dalai Lama effectively took life out of the movement, because running away, not fighting at homeland became the norm. In our case the exile- centered movement also made Oromians to wait for the Diaspora to bring freedom, which negatively prevents strong grassroots movements from emerging which could nurture potential future leaders. I strongly believe that he who is truly prepared to sacrifice for the cause must move to Oromian soil before promising any change. The Diaspora plays important role as supporters of the struggle, but must not be allowed to become center of the movement and suck out the energy.

c)       Eritrea: A Safe Haven for Incompetent Leadership and The Movement that Became Hostage

It is a public secret that Shabia played critical role in forcing the OLF out of the transitional government in 1992. After coercing the organization to encamp its soldiers, Shabia joined hand with TPLF to wipe out OLF. The egomaniac Eritrean leader miscalculated the prospect of using Meles Zenawi as a puppet to  build his war wretched state by exploiting Oromian resources. He mistakenly thought that eliminating OLF from the scene would allow him unconstrained access to the resources of the South. His ambitions began to fade away in front of his eyes, because his supposed puppets in Finfinnee turned against him after they consolidated their grip on the empire. Facing a certain defeat at the hand of the supposed puppet, which was using the entire human and material resources of the empire, Eritrea began to look for proxies, and at the same time OLF leaders happen to be in deep disillusionment that they welcomed the invitation to settle in Asmara.

Eritrea’s role in destroying OLA withstanding, there was  no strategic benefit gained by moving to Eritrea, as there was no landmass or water body that connect Oromia and Eritrea. It is common for an insurgent movement to establish a base in a neighboring country across the border but moving to Eritrea is like moving to Uganda.  It’s unthinkable to provide supply and reinforcement for the fighters across the unfriendly state of Sudan as it was proved to be when SPLA and Khartoum sabotaged almost all efforts. Therefore, I argue that there was only one factor that determined the decision to move to Eritrea, the safety of the leaders.

In addition to the strategic difficulty, moving to Eritrea created three major problems to the movement. First, it created disconnect between the leadership and the soldiers at the front. One has to be under constant eminent danger in order to fiercely fight and such quest for survival forces him to develop effective tactics and strategies not only to defend himself but also to expand his strong hold and move to the offensive.  When a rebel leader is on the field thus he is permanently alert and has to be engaged in commanding  and coordinating his force using strategies and tactics that were developed based on real time situations. The OLF leaders who reside in Asmara were not under such threat, and hence their survival did not depend on the success of their army but rather on the Eritrean government. The strategies and policies they devise were based on outdated information that it was often difficult to implement by the commanders in the field.  This greatly contributed to the failure of few attempts to engage the enemy,  that resulted unnecessary loss of life  and deterioration of  morale amongst commanders and soldiers who finally abandoned the field.

The second obstacle OLF faced by being in Eritrea was the fact that it provided the corrupted leaders institutions to suppress their dissenters. It is no secret that several Oromo students, journalists and soldiers who were critical of the leadership were thrown to the Eritrean jail or prevented from leaving the country for years. This was done to prevent such critics from exposing the corruption and inaction of the leadership.  The third yet most crucial effect of locating in Eritrea is that, it made OLF and the Oromo movement hostage to Shabia-Woyane conflict. The Eritrean regime’s wants to use the OLF as a proxy, therefore it had to effectively control the organization in order to manipulate any outcome of OLF-TPLF engagement as it was evidenced when it vetoed almost all of the negotiations, even those where OLF apparently accepted.  A strong, effective and active OLF that has its leaders outside Eritrea would have not allowed Shabia  to undermine the organizations interest. However, OLF’s chairman who needed Shabia’s protection even from his own dissatisfied soldiers was too happy to serve the former in order to survive and remain at the head of the organization.

Therefore, I strongly believe that relocating the headquarters of OLF to Eritrea was the worst strategic blunder committed by OLF leadership, and being in Eritrea heavily contributed towards weakening the front. I do not believe Eritrea will ever allow OLF to leave, and as long as it remains there, it will not serve the interest of the Oromo people.

Source: OI News

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